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THIS IS A LOOSE ASSORTMENT of historical, philosophical and/or expository papers
dealing with themes of computability, computational complexity and construc-
tiveness in mathematics.
The first part of Göran Sundholm’s wide-ranging essay concerns itself with the
question: can the notion of a function, as employed in constructive mathematics, be
fruitfully identified with that of a recursive function, as understood in computability
theory?
Roughly stated, a function is recursive if and only if instructions for its calcula-
tion can be issued in the form: given the argument(s), proceed thus-and-so until
such-and-such a termination condition obtains; then read off the value from the
end-state of your computation. The sorts of instruction allowed in spelling out
the thus-and-so can be circumscribed in various ways – in terms of Turing
machines, Kleene’s primitive recursive T predicate, etc. – but on any standard
account the resulting class of functions remains the same.
Now although specifying the rules of a process of computation in an unequivo-
cal way presents no special difficulty (at any rate, none that needs to be addressed
here), such a specification will only define a total function if, for every possible
argument, the resulting computation will indeed lead eventually to a state where
the designated termination condition obtains; and the specification will only be
known to define a total function if this unfailing terminability can be proved. This,
Sundholm argues, echoing Heyting and others, spells trouble for any attempt at
basing constructive reasoning on the notion of a recursive function by way of the
BHK interpretation of the logical operators. For according to that interpretation, a
statement of the form 8x9yRxy – such as the claim that, for any input, a certain
process of computation will eventually reach a terminating state – will only qual-
ify as assertable if a constructive function can be produced of which it can be
recognized that for any x it will deliver a y such that Rxy. Thus, establishing an 89
claim requires producing a recognizably total constructive function, while recog-
nizing a recursive function as total requires establishing an 89 claim, and so – so
the argument goes if I have understood it correctly – an identification of construc-
tivity with recursiveness will land us in an infinite regress.
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It is not obvious to me, though, that declining to make this identification will
be sufficient to deliver the constructivist from problems of circularity. On the
BHK interpretation, a universally quantified claim 8xPx is assertable only on the
basis of a function of which it can be recognized that, applied to any x, it will
deliver a (canonical) proof that Px. Thus, establishing a universally quantified
claim requires recognizing that a certain universally quantified claim holds good.
Here again (the point will be familiar) one senses the rumblings of an infinite
regress, and one that arises regardless of how the notion of a function is spelled
out. If Sundholm has a reason for considering the regress described earlier more
vicious than this latter one, I cannot say what it is; it would seem that in both
cases there will be cause for concern if the BHK interpretation is expected to fur-
nish a reductive justification of modes of inference that would otherwise stand
unwarranted, but less so if it is seen as a purely descriptive account of the mean-
ings of mathematical assertions.
Indeed, there seem to be at least three different issues at play here: (1) Are all
functions used in constructive mathematics recursive? (2) Is a grasp of the techni-
cal notion of a recursive function helpful in, maybe even a prerequisite for, grasp-
ing the intuitionistic meanings of the logical connectives? (3) In order to justify
deductions in constructive mathematics, is it necessary first to establish that cer-
tain computational procedures are guaranteed to terminate? It is not always clear
to me which of these questions Sundholm is addressing.
In the second part of his paper, Sundholm considers the concepts of recursive-
ness and constructiveness in the light of Brouwer’s theory of the Creative Subject
(an idealized mathematical thinker), as axiomatized and investigated by Kreisel,
Myhill and others; the axiomatic theory is labelled CS. He demonstrates how the
axioms of CS can be derived from a variant of the principle known as Kripke’s
Schema, and recounts an argument of Kripke’s to the effect that CS in turn
implies the existence of a function amenable to effective evaluation by the Crea-
tive Subject (and hence constructive) despite not being recursive. On the other
hand, Sundholm also raises serious a priori objections to one of the axioms of
CS. I am unable to make out what moral he would have us draw from the fact
that the identification of constructiveness with recursiveness is contradicted by a
theory that he judges inherently implausible anyway.
Finally, Sundholm claims to demonstrate that CS is “classically valid”, a result
he describes as “somewhat surprising”. “Classical validity” in this context turns
out to mean, roughly, derivability from the hypothetical existence of a function
guaranteed, for any proposition A, to deliver a proof either of A or of its negation.
This strikes me as an abuse of the term “classical”; what moves the classical
mathematician to adopt the law of Excluded Middle is not a belief that every
proposition can be either proved or refuted, but a willingness to dissociate the
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notion of truth from that of provability. (Granted, a sufficiently epistemically
diluted understanding of function and proof will make the premiss of Sundholm’s
proof acceptable to a classicist – but on such an understanding, given the way
Sundholm defines the creative-subject notation in terms of the behaviour of cer-
tain functions, the argument’s conclusion becomes classically trivial.)
Thierry Coquand’s contribution to the volume also treats – albeit from a more
expressly historical perspective than Sundholm’s – of the question of construc-
tiveness versus recursiveness in functions and the problem whether a given proc-
ess of computation will ever reach completion and yield a value. In the course of
this discussion, Coquand also brings up (as does Sundholm) the issue of func-
tions that are defined in such a way as to guarantee computability in the eyes of a
classical mathematician despite providing no guidance for actual computation.
An example of such a definition might be
f xð Þ= 1 if Goldbach’s conjecture is true,
0 if Goldbach’s conjecture is false:

An extensionally inclined classicist will maintain that this f is either constant 1 or
constant 0, and hence certainly a computable function – we just do not know
which one. A constructivist, by contrast, will dispute that a function has been
defined at all. Well, the difference in attitude is clear enough; but how exactly is
this meant to bear on the termination issue? Not having been given proper
instructions for computation is one thing; not having received assurance that fol-
lowing given instructions will lead to a desired result is another. Sundholm and
Coquand both run these questions together in ways that leave this reader
perplexed.
The issue of constructive versus recursive functions is encountered yet again in
Marc van Atten’s meticulously researched and philosophically perspicacious
chronicle of Gödel’s shifting positions vis-à-vis intuitionism. With special empha-
sis on the Dialectica interpretation, van Atten traces in Gödel a movement
towards an acceptance of the concept of constructive function(al) as a primitive
notion sufficiently intelligible for foundational work independently of any techni-
cal explication in terms of recursiveness – a historical development similar to that
observed by Coquand in constructivist mathematicians.
The remaining four papers can all be described as concerning themselves with
aspects of real-world computing, as opposed to computability in principle.
Jean Fichot puts an interesting, “feasibilist” twist on proof-theoretical seman-
tics by imposing the requirement that deductive reasoning be underpinned by the
existence, not merely of canonical proofs, but of canonical proofs of manageable
size. Two systems of arithmetical deduction are analysed in this regard, the
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upshot being that “the main restriction that must be made to constructive arithme-
tic in order to obtain a feasible arithmetic is the adoption of a weak induction
principle” (p. 155). One’s curiosity is piqued as to the implications of such a
restriction: will standard results from elementary number theory still be
attainable?
Jean Mosconi provides a historical survey, rich in enjoyable detail, of formal
models of computation from Turing’s seminal work through the 1960’s; Marie
Ferbus-Zanda and Serge Grigorieff give a technical introduction to Kolmogorov
complexity theory; and Ferbus-Zanda applies the concepts of that theory to issues
of information processing in the Internet age.
Ensuring proper English grammar throughout the volume does not appear to
have been a primary editorial concern; in places, deficiencies in this regard are
serious enough to impair readability.
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